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FAMILY LAW CASES AS LAW REFORM
LITIGATION: UNRECOGNIZED PARENTS AND
THE STORY OF ALISOND. V. VIRGINIA M.
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG*
Although the gap between law and lived experience comes as no
surprise to most people, the divergence is especially striking-and
disturbing-in the area of family law. Legal training quickly reveals that
love is not a foundational element of family law, yet it can still be jarring to
find that love has little, if any, bearing on the contours of the legal family.
Love, after all, does not account for who can and cannot marry. Nor does
the past love of an unmarried couple trigger the protections of divorce
should the couple separate.
When children are involved, we might be especially inclined to
think that love should carry some weight in determining whether a parentchild relationship will be recognized. Yet even here, again, love is often not
relevant to the analysis. While an adult might feel like a parent, be treated
like a parent, and be "Mom" or "Dad" to the child, in many states that adult
will not actually be a parent within the law, absent adoption or biological
parentage. For families in those states, a non-legal parent may have no legal
recourse if a couple separates and the "legal" parent bars him or her from
seeing the child. As a matter of law, the non-legal parent and child in this
situation are no closer than strangers.
Ironically, given the law's disinterest in love, the chief hope for the
non-legal parent to regain contact with his or her child lies in showing the
court the love that once defined the family and continues to define the
parent-child relationship. Put another way, non-legal parents must persuade
the court to see the family as it once was. If the court does not understand
that the adults and children before it once functioned as a family, claims
that the parent-child relationship should survive the parents' breakup have
little chance of success.

* Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic,
Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Carol Sanger, Henry Monaghan, and Paula Ettelbrick
for their insights; to Wilson Meeks, Sarai King, and Amy McCamphill for excellent research
assistance; and to Molly Karlin of the Columbia Journalof Gender and Law for thoughtful
editorial suggestions. A version of this article appears in FAMILY LAW STORIES 167 (Carol
Sanger ed., 2008).
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The case of Alison D. v. Virginia M 1 provides an important
opportunity to examine this complex relationship between family life and
family law. Although it was decided in the early 1990s, the case and
surrounding advocacy present questions that remain in play today, and the
decision represents one significant point on the spectrum of family
recognition decisions that continue to shape the lives of many families. The
case arose after Alison's former partner, Virginia, barred Alison from
seeing the child whom the two women had been raising together. Despite
many efforts by Alison's lawyers to tell the family's story during nearly
three and a half years of litigation, New York's highest court held in 1991
that Alison, as a "biological stranger" to her son, 2 lacked standing to
petition the court for visitation.3 Simply put, the New York Court of
Appeals found that Alison, despite being called "mommy" and having
"nurtured a close and loving relationship with the child, ' 4 was not her son's
parent in the eyes of the law.
To explore the law-life relationship, this Article presents the story
of Alison D. on three levels. The first is the personal story of the parties to
the case-or at least the little we can glean from court opinions and other
published accounts; the remainder is under seal, as is traditional with family
law cases in New York. 5 The second tells of lawyering for social change
within the confines of family law and examines the strategies used to
present Alison's family life within a legal framework that denied her the
opportunity to tell her story. The third level takes the long view, looking
both at the many legal changes in the nearly two decades since the case was
decided and at the decision's continued force despite those changes. 6
' 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
2 Id. at

28.

31d.
41d.

5 The litigation documents remain under seal pursuant to New York State
Domestic Relations Law § 235(1), which forbids disclosure of litigation documents in, inter
alia, custody and visitation proceedings. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 235(1) (McKinney 1999 &

Supp. 2007).
6 For

extended doctrinal analysis of the issues presented here regarding non-legal

parents, see, for example, J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Co-Parent Visitation: Acknowledging the
Reality of Two Mother Families, 9 L. & SEXUALITY 151 (2000); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is
a Parent?: The Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J.HUM.
RTs. 513 (1993); John Dewitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationalefor Child Visitation by Legal
Strangers,55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 (1998); William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A
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At each of these levels, the question was not whether Alison was a
good parent but rather whether the courts would permit Alison to show that
she was a parent at all. The account here thus takes as true the facts about
the relationship between Alison and her son that were alleged by Alison and
largely uncontested by Virginia, 7 and then focuses on the challenges
presented as Alison sought to translate her life experience into legal
protection.
This multi-tiered approach to the telling of Alison D. highlights, in
turn, the core conceptual question for the enterprise of family law that runs
through the layers of the story: How closely should family law correspond
to the realities of families' lives? This Article aims not to answer that
question directly but rather to show how the question shaped the parties'
interactions and strategies, as well as the decision's impact on the
development of family recognition law in New York and elsewhere.
More broadly, the discussion below demonstrates that cases like
Alison's can and should fall into the category of "law reform" litigation.
Most often, this label is attached not to family law cases but rather to highprofile federal constitutional challenges to government actions, such as the
detention of enemy combatants or the placement of religious symbols in
state parks and public buildings. On the surface, family law litigation may
appear to have little in common with these kinds of cases, given its typical
focus on fact-intensive evaluations of private relationships.
Yet Alison's case and others like it seek to transform the law, rather
than just resolve individual conflicts, much like plaintiffs in sweeping
constitutional cases. And Alison's lawyers' central task, the same as for
lawyers handling the prototypical law reform case, was to persuade the
court that the status quo was unacceptable and that legal change was
required. Her advocacy strategy had to be tailored to present a story that
was sufficiently compelling, both on the facts and on the law, to make her
desired reforms seem both reasonable and necessary.

Reflection on the Searchfor Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships, 8 J.L. &
POL. 89 (1991); Kimberly P. Carr, Comment, Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best
Interests of the Child in a NontraditionalFamily, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1021 (1992); Laurie A.
Rompala, Note, Abandoned Equity and the Best Interests of the Child: Why Illinois Courts
Must Recognize Same-Sex Parents Seeking Visitation, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1933 (2001).
7 Virginia contested the characterization of the facts but not the facts themselves.
See infra Part II.
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I. THE PRE-LITIGATION STORY, IN CONTEXT
1977 was an exciting time for gay people in the United States. Just
eight years after the Stonewall riots in New York City marked the start of
the gay liberation movement, 8 lesbians and gay men were coming out in
greater numbers than ever before, no longer concealing their sexual
orientation in their workplaces, families, and communities. 9 In major urban
areas, in particular, a busy world of activism and organization had taken off.
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (now Lambda Legal), the
nation's largest legal organization focused on lesbian and gay rights, had
been incorporated just four years earlier.1l The longest-standing national
lesbian and gay organization focused on grassroots organization and
political activism, the National Gay Task Force (now the National Gay and

8 See MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL, at xv (1993); Ken Harlin, The Stonewall

Riot and Its Aftermath (Columbia Univ. Starr East Asian Library, Cases 1 & 2),
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/eresources/exhibitions/sw25/casel.html (last modified
Sept. 27, 2004). Significant activism, organization, and litigation by lesbians and gay men
occurred before the 1969 riots as well. For accounts of this history, see, for example,
PATRICIA CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND

GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 53-56 (2000); ERIC MARCUS, MAKING GAY HISTORY: THE
HALF-CENTURY FIGHT FOR LESBIAN AND GAY EQUAL RIGHTS 3-118 (2002).
9 CAIN, supra note 8; MARCUS, supra note

8.

10Lambda's own incorporation story helps put Alison's situation in context by
illustrating the hostility of many courts toward lesbian and gay rights claims. Although
Lambda's founders had virtually copied the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund's successful application for non-profit status, the New York Appellate Division denied
the application, finding Lambda's mission--"to educate and litigate to improve the legal
status of lesbians and gay men"-to be "neither benevolent nor charitable." In re Thom
Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (App. Div. 1972); ELLEN
ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 1-2 (2005). That decision was reversed by the New York Court

of Appeals on the ground that it was unsupportable, In re Thom, 301 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y.
1973), but the Appellate Division, on remand, insisted on striking the part of Lambda's
mission dedicated to "'promot[ing] legal education among homosexuals by recruiting and
encouraging potential law students who are homosexuals and by providing assistance to such
students after admission to law school."' In re Thom, 350 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1973).
Lambda Legal currently describes itself as "a national organization committed to
achieving full recognition of the civil rights of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgender
people and those with HIV through impact litigation, education and public policy work." See
Lambda Legal, About Lamda Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us (last visited Mar.
29, 2008).
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Lesbian Task Force), was also in its infancy, founded, like Lambda, in
1973."1

While these and similar organizations were focused on creating a
new political world for lesbians and gay men, a small but growing number
of lesbian couples were also taking steps that had been largely unthinkable
just a decade earlier. With the help of friends, sperm banks, and doctors,
these couples began planning for and having children together., 2 Although
these couples were not nearly as networked or strategic as the political and
legal groups, their initiatives to create new family forms were no less
socially and politically transformative.
A. The Alison/Virginia Family Relationship
Alison D. and Virginia M. were among these couples. They met in
the fall of 1977 and began a relationship. 13 By the following spring, they
shared a home and a life together in Putnam County, New York, an area
about eighty miles north of New York City. 14 Two years later, in 1980, they
11 See National

Gay

and

Lesbian

Task

Force,

Task

Force

History,

http://www.thetaskforce.org/aboutus/history (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). The National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force now includes within its mission a focus on bisexual and transgender
people. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, About Us, http://www.
thetaskforce.org/about-us/missionstatements (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
12 See generally ARLENE STEIN, SEX AND SENSIBILITY: STORIES OF A LESBIAN

GENERATION 131-39 (1997).
B3 All of the facts regarding the relationship and litigation between
Alison and
Virginia are taken from the decisions in the case; interviews with Paula L. Ettelbrick,
Alison's lead counsel through the litigation; a videotape of the Court of Appeals argument;
and several articles about the case. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991);
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 1990) (per curiam), aff'd, 572
N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Ettelbrick, supra note 6, at 522-32; Rubenstein, supra note 6; Elliot
Grossman, City Boy at Center of Lawsuit that Aims to Change State Law, POUGHKEEPSIE
JOURNAL, July 24, 1988, at IA; Interview with Paula Ettelbrick, former Staff Attorney and
Legal Director, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, in New York, New York (May
and June, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ettelbrick Interview]. The videotape of the
Court of Appeals argument can be ordered, for a fee, from Albany Law School. The order
form is available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ctapps/VideoForm.pdf (last visited Mar.
29, 2008). Minor, non-material changes to excerpts from pleadings and other litigation
documents quoted in these sources are not bracketed or otherwise marked.

14 See

Ettelbrick, supra note 6; Rubenstein, supra note 6; Grossman, supra note 13.

In the interest of full disclosure, I joined Lambda's legal staff in the fall of 1991,
after Alison D. was decided. Other than participating in one strategy session prior to
Ettelbrick's Court of Appeals argument, I was not involved in the Alison D. litigation.
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started planning in earnest to have children. Like most prospective parents,
they talked extensively with each other about how they would approach
parenthood. But, given that having children was not the norm for lesbian
couples at that time, they also talked with relatives, friends, and a therapist
to think through what it would mean to have a two-mom household.
Although today there are websites aplenty and a small cadre of
well-trained lawyers to assist lesbian couples contemplating parenting, 5
consulting with a lawyer was not the obvious thing to do at the time that
Alison and Virginia began planning their family. What little law existed
regarding lesbian parents did not even begin to address how lesbian couples
might provide legal protection for their families. In some jurisdictions
today, prospective parents like Alison and Virginia can plan to secure the
non-biological (or non-adoptive) parent's relationship with the child6
through "second-parent adoption," which is akin to step-parent adoption.
But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when lesbian couples were first
beginning to have children via physician-assisted insemination, the idea that
two women could present themselves to a court, as a couple, and seek legal
recognition as their child's mothers was not yet a realistic possibility, either
for parents or advocates. 17 Indeed, most states barely had laws in place
regulating the legal status of children born to married couples with sperm
from an unknown donor, let alone legal frameworks for8 determining the
parental rights of lesbian couples raising children together.'
Instead, at that time, virtually all of the limited, scattered case law
regarding the status of lesbian mothers arose in the context of post-divorce
15See, e.g., National Center for Lesbian Rights, Issues & Cases, Families &
Parenting, http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue-families (last visited
Mar. 29, 2008).
16 See, e.g., Sara R. David, Note, Turning Parental Rights into Parental
Obligations-HoldingSame-Sex, Non-BiologicalParents Responsiblefor Child Support, 39

NEW ENG. L. REv. 921, 928 (2005) ("Second-parent adoptions are effectively step-parent
adoptions that do not require the parents to be married.").
17One of the earliest known second-parent adoptions involving a lesbian couple
was granted in Alaska in 1985. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 522-23 (1990) (discussing In re Adoption of
A.O.L., No. IJU-85-25-P/A (Alaska Super. Ct. July 25, 1985)).
18 The Uniform Parentage Act first addressed the consequences of physicianassisted insemination for parental rights in 1973, but its provisions covered only married
couples and the donor. See Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law:
Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 465, 465-66 (2006). Not until
2002 was the Act amended to address insemination of unmarried women. Id. at 467.
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custody and visitation disputes between the lesbian mother and her former
husband.1 9 Why so few cases? As Rhonda Rivera, an early scholar of
lesbian and gay rights, observed in a landmark 1979 article, lesbian mothers
and gay fathers feared losing friends, family, jobs, and, most importantly,
their children, if their sexual orientation became known. 20 For many courts,
the fact that a mother was a lesbian was itself considered contrary to her
child's best interests, regardless of her parenting abilities or relationship
with the child. 21 Even if a lesbian mother was permitted to retain custody of
her children, restrictive court orders often barred her from associating with
other lesbians, including an intimate partner. 22 For all of these reasons, most
lesbian mothers rightly believed that they were better off negotiating with
their former husbands for custody of and visitation with their children out of
23
court, bargaining in the shadow of unfavorable law.
This limited case law on divorce was not particularly relevant to
women like Alison and Virginia, however, as their children would have
lesbian parents whether the court granted custody to one parent or the other.
Nor were there decisions from cases involving children raised by other
lesbian couples to warn Alison and Virginia about the risks that their family
might face if their relationship ended. As family law scholar Nancy Polikoff
noted in 1990, "[c]ases concerning custody and visitation rights upon the
dissolution of lesbian-family relationships [did not begin] to reach trial
courts [until] the mid-1980s. 24 Given how little legal authority was
available, it is unsurprising then that Alison and Virginia did not consider
consulting a lawyer to be an important step in their family planning process.
19 See Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 885-86 (1979).
20 Id. at 886-904.

21 See, e.g., Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1975) (stating that
"homosexuality is a factor which the trial court could consider"); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981) ("Because the trial court has determined that both parents are
'fit, willing and able' to assume custody of the children we believe the homosexuality of
Sandra is the overriding factor [justifying denial of custody]."). Most courts simply
presumed harm rather than considering whether the parent's lesbian or gay sexual orientation
actually caused harm to the child. Rivera, supra note 19, at 886-904.
22

Rivera, supra note 19, at 890-904.

23 For early discussion of the law's effects on extralitigation negotiations, see
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
24

Polikoff, supra note 17, at 533.
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The couple ultimately decided that Virginia would be the biological
parent and that they would raise the child together, sharing responsibility
for the child's care and associated expenses. Virginia became pregnant via
insemination by their doctor with sperm from an unknown donor, and
Andrew,2 5 the couple's son, was born in July 1981. As Alison and Virginia
had agreed, Andrew's surname included the surnames of both of his
mothers.
Immediately after Andrew's birth, Virginia took a three-month
maternity leave from her job, while Alison continued to work as a social
worker to cover the family's expenses. As Andrew grew, both Alison and
Virginia shared in the myriad activities involved in raising a young child,
from doctor visits and discipline to the ins and outs of nursery school.
Andrew's grandparents included Alison's parents ("Grammy" and
"Granddad") and Alison's grandfather ("Poppa").
When Andrew was two years old, Alison and Virginia had a second
child, with Alison as the biological parent this time. Alison gave birth to a
daughter, Amy, 6 whom the couple also began to raise together.
In November 1983, several months after Amy was born, Alison and
Virginia ended their relationship, and Alison moved out of the family's
home. Like most separations, this one was not easy, particularly because
Alison had found a new partner. Though Andrew remained with Virginia
and Amy went with Alison, the women agreed that they would both remain
involved in both children's lives. They agreed that Andrew would stay
overnight with Alison two or three nights per week and would also spend
some birthdays, holidays, and vacation time with her. With Virginia's
encouragement, Alison took Andrew on vacations and to events with her
extended family and continued in her role as one of his mothers.
For more than two years after the break-up, Alison continued to pay
her half of the mortgage for the home that she and Virginia had bought and
shared, in part because Virginia could not afford to make the full payments.
As Alison later explained in pleadings filed in the case, she viewed these
payments as "a form of child support." By early 1986, however, Virginia
was able to buy Alison's share of the house, and soon after, she began to
limit Alison's time with Andrew. Andrew objected to these restrictions,

25 The court identified Alison and Virginia's child by his initials, A.D.M., to
protect his privacy. I have substituted the name Andrew here.
26

"Amy" is also not the child's real name. Public reports of the case provide no

information about Amy, however, other than that she was born while Alison and Virginia
were still together; hence, she receives little mention in this Article.
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Alison later wrote in the pleadings, and wanted to spend more time with
her.
The next year, Alison was offered a one-year position in Dublin,
Ireland. Before accepting, she confirmed with Virginia that she could
continue her relationship with Andrew during the year abroad. According to
Alison, Virginia promised that Alison could write letters, speak weekly with
Andrew by phone, and visit him on her trips back to the United States. The
former couple also agreed that Alison's parents and grandfather would
continue spending time with Andrew. With this plan in place, Alison took
the position and moved temporarily to Dublin with Amy and her new
partner, Margaret. 27
But shortly after Alison moved, Virginia changed her telephone
number to an unlisted one. She also returned Alison's letters and gifts to
Andrew unopened and barred Grammy, Granddad, and Poppa from
contacting him.
At this point, the private conflict between Virginia and Alison took
its first steps toward becoming a legal dispute. Late in that summer of 1987,
Virginia hired a lawyer who wrote to Alison in Dublin: "I am returning
your latest attempt to communicate with Andrew. Please stop it. We will
continue to return to you any such letters from you,28 directly or indirectly.
You may believe this to be fun and games. It is not.,
In October 1987, the situation grew worse. Alison, Margaret, and
Amy returned briefly from Dublin. Without notifying Virginia, Alison and
Margaret visited Andrew, now age six, when he was home with a
babysitter. They took him for a walk and gave him all of the letters and gifts
that Virginia had returned unopened to Alison. When Virginia found out
about the unannounced visit, she went to the local police and filed
harassment charges. In her affidavit, she stated that Andrew "was very
upset and confused" by29 the visit, and that "[f]or several weeks after, [he]
was tearful and angry."

Alison, in turn, wrote to Virginia in November 1988: "I am very
worried that things are at the point where each of us is on the verge of
taking legal action .... I can't believe you wouldn't agree that this could

27 Alison's

new partner's name is not in the public record, so I am using the name

Margaret here.
28

Grossman, supra note 13.

29

Id. There is no information in the public record about the charges, which were

likely dropped when Alison returned to Dublin.
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30

Her letter

You cannot totally stop me from having a relationship with
[Andrew], no matter to what lengths you go ....You know how
much I mean to him ....Is it possible for you to believe that all I
want, and all [Andrew] probably wants, is to be able to continue
31
to see each other?

She concluded: "Can't we figure out a compromise that will stop
the confrontational course we are on?" 32 Virginia's answer was no.
B. Preparations for Litigation
Around the same time she reached out to Virginia to try to resolve
the conflict privately, Alison realized that she might need help in trying to
maintain her relationship with Andrew. After first contacting a local lawyer,
Alison called Paula Ettelbrick, then a staff attorney of Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund. As Ettelbrick recalled, "[i]n those days, calls
just came out of the blue on lesbian parenting issues, and Alison was a very
resourceful person. 33 While much of Lambda's docket was taken up with
HIV-related discrimination, Ettelbrick had concentrated on lesbian and gay
family law issues since arriving at Lambda in the spring of 1986. Alison's
call was one of many similar calls from parents she would receive over the
course of her seven years on Lambda's staff. Shortly after hearing from
Alison, Ettelbrick met with Lambda's Legal Advisory Committee, a group
of lawyers who consulted with Lambda's small legal staff on prospective
cases.
Some members of the Committee were concerned about bringing a
case like Alison's in New York. Just a few months earlier, in Ronald FF.v.
Cindy GG., the New York Court of Appeals had rejected the visitation
petition of a man who had spent nearly a year parenting his then-girlfriend's
child.34 Relying on the fundamental right of a legal parent "to choose those
30

id.

31 Id.
32

id.

33Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13.
3'511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987).
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with whom her child associates,"3 5 the court had held that Ronald, as a
"biological stranger," 36 was not entitled to seek court-ordered visitation
against the mother's wishes. 37 Ettelbrick argued that Ronald FF. could be
distinguished on factual grounds: Ronald had not planned with the
biological mother to have a child and did not have as long or as deep an
involvement in raising the child as Alison had.
Ettelbrick also pointed out that Ronald FF.did not foreclose Alison
from making equitable arguments to support the court's consideration of
factors not addressed explicitly by the law governing visitation, such as
fairness to the parties. This reading of Ronald FF.would leave Alison free
to argue that she stood in loco parentis to Andrew, a status in equity that
recognizes adults who "[stand] in the place of a parent. 38 In addition,
Alison could argue that Virginia should be equitably estopped from denying
Alison's parental status because Virginia herself had encouraged Alison's
parental relationship with Andrew, thereby satisfying the traditional
for equitable estoppel-representation, reliance, and
prerequisites
39
detriment.

In addition, Alison was seeking visitation, not custody. This more
limited assertion of parental rights might be viewed more favorably by the
court than a demand to shift custody away from Virginia, the biological
mother. Further, presumably, the focus on visitation could diminish factual
concerns that might be raised about Alison having first left the relationship
to be with a new partner and then departing for a long stint outside the
United States (albeit in reliance on Virginia's promise that her relationship
with Andrew could continue).
At this point, one might wonder about the possible tension for a gay
rights organization in representing one lesbian against another. But the
question has an easy answer. Lambda's mission, after all, is not to represent
all gay people, but rather to end discrimination and other harms based on
31 Id. at 77.
36 Id. at

76.

37 id.

38 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 359 (3d Pocket ed. 2006) (translating from the

Latin).
39

See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESTITUTION

84-85 (2d ed. 1993). New York courts that have embraced equitable estoppel as a basis for
according standing to a non-legal parent typically consider the adult's tenure in the home
with the child, the adult's provision of support for the child's welfare, and the child's best
interests. See Ettelbrick, supra note 6, at 524 & nn.46-48.
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sexual orientation. 40 This mission includes reforming the law to secure the
rights of families created by lesbian and gay couples,4' which was exactly
what Alison sought to do. To the extent Virginia was taking advantage of
the law's failure to recognize the families of same-sex couples, her position
denied the reality of the family she created with Alison and was, in
Lambda's view, contrary to the organization's aims. In late 1987, Lambda
told Alison it would take her case.
Virginia was represented by Anthony G. Maccarini, a lawyer in
private practice in Putnam County, New York, who presumably charged his
standard fees (unlike Lambda, which represents its clients without
charge).42 At the time, organizations that actively opposed recognition of
the rights of gay people, such as the Moral Majority,43 were forceful public
players but did not ordinarily involve themselves in family law cases.44
Today, by contrast, numerous organizations, such as the Alliance Defense
Fund (ADF),45 describe themselves as dedicated to preserving the
"traditional family," and some of these groups focus intensively on the
courts as a forum for opposing the rights of lesbian and gay parents and
couples.46 Although Alison and Virginia's conflict would have been a
complicated case for an organization like ADF to handle because Virginia
had not disavowed being a lesbian, a "traditional family" organization
might still have sought to participate in some way to support Virginia's
restrictive interpretation of the state's family law.4 7
40

See Lambda Legal, About Lambda Legal, supra note 10.

41

id.

42

See Lamda Legal, Support Lambda Legal, https://secure.ga3.org/01/donate2

(last visited Mar. 29, 2008) ("We do not charge our plaintiffs.").
43 See Moral Majority, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2007).
44 Cf id. (noting that the Moral Majority was a "political action group" which
engaged in tasks such as lobbying).
45 Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), http://www.alliancedefensefund.org (last visited

Mar. 29, 2008).
46

The ADF's "Traditional Family" Project, for example, describes its work as

fighting to preserve the "traditional family" against incursions by, among others, lesbians
and gay men. See Alliance
Defense Fund, Protecting
Family Values,
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/issues/TraditionaFamily/Default.aspx (last visited Mar.
29, 2008).
47 In a case in which a child's biological mother had announced that she was no
longer a lesbian, an ADF-affiliated attorney represented the woman against her former civil
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Alison and Lambda needed a private, local lawyer on their side as
well. As Lambda was a New York City-based organization with a national
agenda, its standard practice included incorporating the pro bono services of
a local cooperating attorney on all of its cases. This was particularly
important for family law cases like Alison's. A cooperating attorney could
bring familiarity with the upstate court's rules and practices but also, and
perhaps more importantly, a local attorney could help ensure that the court
saw Alison as an individual with her child's best interests at heart rather
than as a front for a broader political battle about gay rights.
In the 1980s it was not an easy feat to find a lawyer in upstate New
York willing to represent a lesbian seeking to sue another lesbian for
visitation with the couple's child. Many lawyers had little idea that lesbianparented families even existed, and of those who did, most were either
48
hostile or completely pessimistic about the prospects for success.
Ettelbrick reached out to Noel Tepper, a solo practitioner in Poughkeepsie
with
a reputation
for taking
on "unusual"
cases.in49 the
Tepper
as a pro
bono cooperating
attorney
for Lambda
case.quickly signed on
II. THE FIRST STAGES OF THE LITIGATION
A. Framing the Case
The question of how to frame the case-or, more precisely, how to
structure Alison's petition to the court-was critical. To succeed, the
lawyers had to make a strong doctrinal showing to persuade the court that
the law could recognize Alison and Andrew's relationship. At the same
time, their presentation of the case had to be attentive to an array of nondoctrinal factors, since most judges had no experience with visitation
petitions by the non-biological mothers of children born into two-mother
households.

union partner, with whom she had been raising the child. See Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808
(Utah 2007). For further discussion of the case, see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
After the Utah Supreme Court ruled in the biological mother's favor, the ADF's press release
proclaimed "A HUGE Victory For a Mother and Daughter . . . A HUGE Defeat for the
Homosexual Legal Agenda . . . !" http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/updates/
2007_0220.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
48

See generally Rivera, supra note 19 (describing the generally unfavorable legal

position of gay people in civil matters in the late 1970s).
49 Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13.
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If Alison and Virginia had been married, this step in the litigation
would not have required high-level strategizing. Alison would have filed for
divorce and, within that familiar governing framework, custody and
visitation regarding the children born during the marriage would have been
decided by a New York family court judge based on the best interests of the
child. 0
But Alison and Virginia were not married and could not have
married. 5 1 Their relationship was not visible within the traditional scope of
family law. Consequently, they did not have the benefit of existing divorce
and custody law to govern the conflict over visitation.5 2 Moreover, because
Alison and Andrew lacked a biological or adoptive connection, they had no
formal legal relationship.
Thus, Alison's lawyers faced difficult questions as they strategized
about how best to present Alison's claims. How much, if at all, would it
matter that Alison and Virginia were a lesbian couple as opposed to an
unmarried heterosexual couple? Should the petition acknowledge that, in
some respects, Alison's claim was on the cutting edge? Or, by contrast,
should it frame the case as involving roughly the same issues as any run-ofthe-mill parenting dispute? Addressing these competing concerns required
something of a balancing act both at the initial pleading stage and
throughout the course of the litigation.

50 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (2007) (requiring custody and visitation
determinations to be made, subject to certain provisions, with "regard to the circumstances of
the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child").
51Articles 2 and 3 of Chapter 14 of New York Domestic Relations Law govern
marriage in New York State. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW ch. 14, art. 2-3 (2007). Although the
statutory provisions did not explicitly preclude same-sex couples from marrying at the time
of Alison and Virginia's conflict, no state court or legislature had even come close to
recognizing marriage rights for same-sex partners. See CAIN, supra note 8, at 160-62
(describing efforts by same-sex couples to secure marriage rights during the 1970s); Rivera,
supra note 19, at 904-06 (noting, in 1979, that "[tihe Supreme Court's acceptance of... a
quasi-marital status does not appear to be imminent"). Confirming this view of the statute,
the New York Court of Appeals held in 2006 that, in light of the common understanding of
marriage at the time Articles 2 and 3 were written in 1909, the relevant Domestic Relations
Law provisions "clearly limit[] marriage to opposite-sex couples." Hernandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006).
52 Although divorce law might not be recognized widely as a "benefit" of
marriage, its structure and background rules often provide invaluable assistance to
individuals seeking to restructure their lives after the end of a relationship. See generally
Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, II HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 625 (1988).
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Ettelbrick and Tepper decided to bring Alison's claim as a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. 53 In New York, Section 70 of the Domestic
Relations Law specifically authorizes habeas petitions in disputes about
child custody and visitation, providing that "either parent may apply to the
supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus ... [and] the court, on due

consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge and custody of
such child to either parent. 54 But was Alison a "parent" within this
provision? This question became the central issue in the case.
Alison's petition seeking visitation with Andrew, filed in a New
York Supreme Court in March 1988, described in detail the commitment
between Alison and Virginia, their decision to have a child together, their
agreement that both women would be Andrew's parents even though
53Although best known as the petition filed by prisoners who believe that they

have been wrongly detained by the state, see, e.g., Habeas Relieffor State Prisoners, 36
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 875 (2007), habeas petitions are available whenever a
party believes that a person is being unlawfully restrained by someone else, including a
private actor such as a parent. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999 & Supp.
2007).
54N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).

The statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Where a minor child is residing within this state, either parent may
apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such
minor child brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the
court, on due consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge
and custody of such child to either parent for such time, under such
regulations and restrictions, and with such provisions and directions, as
the case may require, and may at any time thereafter vacate or modify
such order. In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody
of the child in either parent, but the court shall determine solely what is
for the best interest of the child, and what will best promote its welfare
and happiness, and make award accordingly.
(b) Any order under this section which applies to rights of visitation with
a child ... shall be enforceable ... against any person or official having
care or custody ... of such child.
Id. Although section 70 did not mention visitation at the time Alison filed her
petition, it had been construed to cover visitation petitions as well. See Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (App. Div. 1990) (per curiam) (citing In re Pierson, 511
N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1987)).
For historical background on the use of habeas proceedings in child custody and
visitation litigation, see generally Paul J. Buser, Habeas Corpus Litigation in Child Custody
Matters: An HistoricalMine Field, 11 J. AM. ACAD. MATRiMONIAL L. 1 (1993).
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Virginia was Andrew's birth parent, and their sharing of parental
responsibilities.5 5 Its "thick" description aimed to show a judge who might
be unfamiliar with lesbian couples and their children that Alison had been
as much Andrew's parent as Virginia, and that function, not biology, should
guide the evaluation of Alison and Andrew's relationship.56 At the same
time, the petition suggested that Alison's claim was, at its core, much the
same as the claims of other parents seeking visitation with their children.5 7
In response to Alison's petition, Virginia maintained that biology
was all that mattered. "Someone who has no biological tie to the child has
no visitation rights," Anthony Maccarini argued on her behalf.58 Erasing
any trace of familial relationship, he added: "What right
does the former co59
other?"
the
of
child
the
see
to
have
house
a
of
tenant
B. The Trial Court Decision and the First Appeal
On March 23, 1988, Ettelbrick and Tepper appeared before acting
Supreme Court Justice James D. Benson to present argument on Alison's
behalf. As it turned out, none of their strategizing appeared to influence the
outcome. Immediately after the lawyers presented their arguments, Judge
Benson ruled from the bench. His decision-a mere page and a half of court
transcript, which amounted to about three minutes of oral presentationdismissed Alison's petition outright, finding "no allegations upon which the
relief that is requested could be granted within the law of the State of New
York., 60 Noting that "the biological parent of a child is the parent within the
meaning of the statute," Judge Benson cited Ronald FF.and "decline[d]
to
61
adopt the definition of parent as someone standing in loco parentis."
Neither Alison nor her lawyers were greatly surprised at the
outcome, and they quickly appealed. Because appeals from the
Poughkeepsie trial court were heard in New York's Second Department in
Brooklyn, Tepper stepped aside and Ettelbrick brought in Deborah
55 Grossman, supra note 13; Ettelbrick Interview, supranote 13.
56

Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13.

57 Grossman, supra note 13.
58

id.

59 Id.

6 id.
61

Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13.
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Rothberg, an associate at a large Manhattan firm, to take on the cooperating
attorney role. In 1988, most large firms had yet to take on a lesbian or gay
rights case on a pro bono basis.62 Rothberg, who had been a New York
University Law School student when she first met Ettelbrick, convinced her
colleagues at the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue to take the case.
The appeal presented Alison's lawyers with an opportunity to brief
the issues in the case more thoroughly than they had at the trial level, which
meant that the strategy questions present from the outset had to be
considered with care once again. Alison's lawyers had to ensure that the
court had enough information to understand the seemingly "new" type of
family at the center of this case. At the same time, however, they had to
show that Alison, as a parent in this family, fit well within traditional family
law principles and stood in loco parentis to Andrew, which would give her
standing to seek visitation with her son.
63
Since most courts had not yet encountered families like Alison's,
Lambda's brief for Alison, like its briefs in other early lesbian custody and
visitation disputes, would have begun not with doctrinal arguments, but
rather with background information about lesbian couples forming families
and having children together. 64 This part of the brief would have described
physician-assisted insemination and informed the court that as many as
twenty thousand women each year became pregnant in this way, including a
growing number of lesbians.6 5 It also would have explained the use of the
term "co-parent" for Alison as a means of recognizing (and challenging) the
binary distinction between legal and non-legal parents. 66 While ti
this
information was basic-a sort of Lesbian Parenting 101-it was also
essential in showing that Alison was Andrew's parent.
62 id.

63 See generally Polikoff, supra note 17

(discussing the genesis and development

of legal arguments regarding the meaning of parenthood).
64 See Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13. As noted earlier, the entire record is
sealed. Discussion here, therefore, does not cite to the briefs filed in the case but relies
instead on the interviews and articles cited previously.
65 A

brief written at the time Alison's brief was prepared would have contained the

type of information cited in Note, Reproductive Technology and the ProcreationRights of
the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REv. 669, 669 n.1 (1985) (explaining the process and

increasingly widespread use of physician-assisted insemination). Sources available at the
time to show the numbers of lesbians having children included, for example, DONNA J.
HITCHENS, LESBIANS CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD: LEGAL ISSUES IN DONOR INSEMINATION
(1984); CHERI PIES, CONSIDERING PARENTHOOD: A WORKBOOK FOR LESBIANS (1985).

66 See HITCHENS, supra note 65, at 105.
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The brief also would have situated lesbian parents like Alison
within a broader phenomenon of family diversity, pointing out that many
families are better understood by function than by form.67 Consequently, the
brief would have urged that children's interests are best served by
preserving emotional bonds with the adults they depend on for love,
parenting, and support.
Even with these points in place, a crucial practical and theoretical
question remained: Who should be considered a functional parent? Courts,
68
after all, tend to prefer bright-line rules to case-by-case formulations.
While no brief could answer this question for all family configurations,
Alison's brief emphasized three important factors: intent, experience, and
voluntariness. 69 It explained that Alison and Virginia both intended to
parent jointly, that they did parent jointly, and that over the course of six
years, Virginia had voluntarily created and actively encouraged the
development of an emotional and psychological parent-child bond between
Alison and Andrew. Accordingly, Alison argued, Virginia should be
estopped from treating her as anything other than a parent. Framing the
story in this way also helped Alison show that she was in a materially
different position than the functional father in Ronald FF.because Alison,
unlike Ronald, had planned for Andrew's birth, had been in Andrew's life
67 A child support case, Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fam. Ct. 1985),

helps illustrate Alison's point. In Karin T., the family court required Michael, who presented

herself to the world as male, but was legally female, to provide child support for two
children born to Karin by donor insemination while Karin and Michael were in a relationship
(during which they had obtained a marriage license and had a marriage ceremony). Id. at
781, 784. Defending against a child support claim by the Department of Social Services,
Michael had argued that she was a woman and was not biologically or legally related to the
children. The family court found Michael liable on an equitable estoppel theory, concluding
that Michael's conduct "certainly brought forth these offspring as if done biologically." Id. at
784.
Although a court might have perceived Karin T.'s facts to be even more "unusual"
than Alison's, which in turn might have provoked some litigators to avoid mentioning the
case for fear it would spark even greater skepticism of Alison's claim, relying on Karin T
had two distinct benefits. It showed-in a case further removed from the mainstream than
Alison's-that a New York court was capable of recognizing a functional family. Moreover,
because Alison was seeking to claim rather than avoid responsibility for her son, the contrast
with Michael's conduct worked in her favor.
68See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social
ConstructionistArguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REv. 629 (2002).
69

Discussion of the brief here is based on my construction of the arguments from

the appellate decision and the sources cited in note 13 supra.

2008]

Family Law Cases as Law Reform Litigation

from the moment he was born, and had continued in a parental role over the
course of many years.
Alison also had new New York case law to support her claim. The
summer after Judge Benson's terse ruling, the New York Court of Appeals
held, in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., that a gay couple should be treated
as a "family" under New York City's rent control regulations.70
Specifically, the court held that the surviving partner of a couple that had
lived together in a rent-controlled apartment could succeed to his deceased
partner's lease (a valuable commodity in the New York real estate
market). 7' The court had explicitly embraced a functional approach to the
case, holding that "the term 'family' . . . should not be rigidly restricted to

those people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for
instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order., 72 Although Braschi
arose in the housing context, the decision seemed to bode well for Alison's
claim. The Braschi holding, after all, demonstrated the Court of Appeals'
capacity to look beyond narrow legal categories to give legal effect to the
relationship of a gay couple. If it could do that for real estate, perhaps it
could be persuaded to do the same in the context of a parent-child
relationship, where the harm from a loss would arguably be much greater.
To bolster this array of arguments, Ettelbrick solicited two amicus
briefs. The first, from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the
New York Civil Liberties Union, rounded out the constitutional support for
Alison's visitation claim.

73

The second, from the Gay and Lesbian Parents

Coalition International and several other family organizations, provided an
expanded portrait of gay- and lesbian-parented families.74
For her part, Virginia presumably argued that Ronald FF.governed
Alison's claim and that the statutory language of Section 70 did not allow
for the term "parent" to include an adult unrelated by biology or adoption. 5
70 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).

71Id. at 52-55.
72

Id. at 53.

73See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 321 (App. Div. 1990) (per
curiam), aff'd, 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13.
74See Alison D., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 321; Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13.
75Although Alison's claims can be gleaned from the decision in the case and some
of the articles about it, little has been written to elaborate Virginia's arguments. Still, based
on the doctrine available at the time, the appellate court's ruling, and related resources, see
supra note 13, these arguments are likely to mirror those that Virginia either made or
considered making.
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Although that argument could have stood alone, she might have made a
"slippery slope" public policy argument as well, suggesting that any
broadening of the definition could potentially harm legal parents by opening
them up to visitation demands from any adult whom they had invited into
their children's lives.
As another option, Virginia could have portrayed Alison as a "bad"
adult who lacked serious intent to maintain a familial relationship, because
she first left the relationship and then left the country. It is unlikely, though,
that Virginia pursued this approach. Discussing these facts would have
invited the court to consider Alison's conduct-which would, in turn, have
diminished Virginia's argument that Alison was not entitled to have the
facts of her relationship with Andrew considered at all.
C. A Second Loss: The Appellate Division Decision
Notwithstanding Alison's functional analysis, Virginia's position
prevailed; three of the four Appellate Division justices found themselves
6
They recognized that the Ronald FF.opinion
constrained by Ronald FF.7
had not addressed the in loco parentis argument that was at the heart of
Alison's case. 7 But, the court held, Alison's arguments did "not, in their
factual underpinnings[] or legal analyses[,] differ [from Ronald's] in any
material way.",78 Braschi's functional analysis of family was also unavailing
according to the majority, which characterized the case as a mere "dispute
over tenancy rights to a rent-controlled apartment., 79 The appellate court's
brief opinion also summarily rejected Alison's equitable estoppel theory
and the constitutional arguments advanced by the ACLU.8 °
In a rhetorical move that has now become standard for courts
denying familial status to lesbians and gay men,8' the Appellate Division
stressed that the decision intended no disrespect to Alison personally by
stating: "We do not, by virtue of our determination on this issue, minimize,
in any way, the close and loving relationship that the petitioner has
76 Alison D., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 322-24.

"

ld.at

324.

78 id.
79id.
8

oId.

81See, e.g., Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 819 (Utah 2007).
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apparently developed with the child.",82 This acknowledgment provided
little comfort to Alison, who remained barred from seeing her son.
The only bright note for Alison was Justice Sybil Hart Kooper's
dissent. Justice Kooper characterized Alison's case as consistent with New
York's in loco parentis doctrine 83 and with Braschi, which looked beyond
"'fictitous [sic] legal distinctions or genetic history' and instead examined
the "'reality of family life.' 84 Justice Kooper also rejected the argument
that allowing standing to functional parents would lead to a slippery slope
of problems for legal parents:
As to the assertion that such a holding would open the door to a
potentially limitless series of applications, I am confident that the
trial courts, in the sound exercise of their discretion, will not
lightly infringe upon the favored rights of a natural parent and
that a searching inquiry into the best interests of the child8 5will
forestall any unwarranted interference with that relationship.
III. LITIGATION AT THE STATE HIGH COURT
Five weeks later, Alison's lawyers filed their request for leave to
appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. In press releases and public
comments regarding the appeal, they stressed that the case would "heavily
influence thinking about the changing face of legally-recognized families
across the nation. 86 They also emphasized the larger universe of children
who might be cut off from a loving parent under the appellate court's
ruling, stating, "'The notion that only biological parents can seek visitation
or custody is not only unfair and absurd, but profoundly unrealistic in a
world where children grow up in many kinds of families."'' 87 The court
82 Alison D., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 324. Adding insult to injury, the court suggested that

Alison had offered strong facts to support her claim: "Indeed, had the petitioner come within
the meaning of the term 'parent' contained in Domestic Relations Law § 70, her claim for
visitation would have been worthy of serious consideration." Id.
83 Id. at 325-26 (Kooper, J.,dissenting).
dissenting) (quoting Braschi v. StahlAssocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49,
84Id. (Kooper, J.,
53 (N.Y. 1989)).
85 Id. at 327-28.

86 Press Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Lambda
Appeals Precedent-Setting Parenting Case for Lesbian Non-Biological Mother (Oct. 29,
1990) (on file with the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law).
87

Id.(quoting Paula Ettelbrick).
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granted review, putting a case involving a lesbian-parented family on the
state high court's docket for the very first time.
A. Strategy Questions Redux
Alison now had her last chance to persuade a court to see her
relationship with Andrew as parental and to recognize that she and Andrew
were not a pair of legal strangers, but rather a mother and her son. It was
now the fall of 1990, seven years after Alison and Virginia had ended their
relationship and roughly three years since Virginia began to block Alison
from contacting Andrew.
Within those few years, lesbian parents had come increasingly into
the public spotlight. A 1990 Newsweek article announced that as many as
ten thousand lesbians had borne children into single or two-parent lesbian
households and that hundreds of others had adopted children.8 8 At least a
half-dozen articles featuring lesbian parents had appeared in major national
newspapers since 1989.89 And with every passing year, courts in New York
and elsewhere faced an increasing number of cases involving diverse family
forms, 90 of which families like Alison's were just one type.
Among the important strategy questions for Alison's lawyers at this
stage was (yet again) what to do about Ronald FF. Both courts below had
treated Ronald FF.as controlling the outcome in Alison's case, suggesting
strongly that the briefs to the Court of Appeals should devote immediate
and significant attention to distinguishing it. On the other hand, an
argument focusing first on legal distinctions between the visitation theories
advanced in Ronald FF. and those advanced in Alison's case, without the
surrounding framework of Alison's family story, would be unlikely to gain
much traction. Moreover, by discussing Ronald FF.only later in the briefs,
88 Jean Seligman, Variations on a Theme, NEWSWEEK, SPECIAL ED., Winter 1990-

Spring 1991,at 39.
89 See Jane Meredith Adams, Gay Couples Begin a Baby Boom, BOSTON GLOBE,

Feb. 6, 1989, at 2; Patrice Gaines-Carter & Amy Stevens, Gay Pride March to Mark
Milestones on Road to Acceptance, WASH. POST, June 18, 1989, at DI; Ann Hagedom &
Amy Dockser Marcus, Case in California Could Expand Legal Definition of Parenthood,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1989, at B10; Gina Kolata, Lesbian Partners Find the Means to be
Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1989, at A13; Jonathan Mandell, The Lesbian Baby Boom:
Many Lesbian Couples Have Decided There's No Reason to be Childless, NEWSDAY, July
13, 1989, at 4; David Margolick, Lesbian Child-Custody Cases Test Frontiers of Family
Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at Al.
90 See Craig W. Christenson, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay

and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 1299 (1997).
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Alison's lawyers could signal their view that the decision did not govern
here. Then again, unless the court could see its way around Ronald FF.,
even the most well-constructed, heart-wrenching narrative would not be
heard. From this perspective, a strong doctrinal distinction between Ronald
FF.and Alison's case would have to come first.
Of course, like many litigation choices, the actual effects of the one
made here cannot be known. Instead, the value of reflecting on the
possibilities comes in the reminder that the litigation choices made in the
midst of a law reform case are frequently neither obvious nor easy.
B. The Multiple Roles of Amici Curiae
At this final stage of the litigation, Lambda began a focused effort
to gather amicus briefs in support of Alison's position. 91 The amici had
several roles to play. First and most obviously, their briefs brought before
the court arguments and information that Alison's brief could not include
either because of page limits or because of the risk that the additional
material would distract from her central claims. Each of the six amicus
briefs filed in support of Alison's position focused on distinct points,
ranging from constitutional arguments by the American Civil Liberties
Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union, to extended discussion of
Braschi and equitable doctrines by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, to the connection between functional parenthood and children's
best interests by National Organization of Women Legal Defense and
Education Fund (NOW LDEF).92 Others provided more information about
lesbian and gay parenting cases, about the substantial interest of children

91 On the value of amicus briefs, see Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm'r, 293
F.3d 128, 131-33 (3d Cir. 2002) (characterizing the view that amici must be impartial as

"outdated" and rejecting the contention that amici should be permitted to file briefs only
when parties are inadequately represented); Andrew Frey, Amici Curiae: Friends of the
Court or Nuisances?, LITIG., Fall 2006, at 5 (outlining reasons why amicus briefs "can often
be extremely helpful to the courts"); Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law
Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33 (2004) (detailing the value of
amicus briefs in Supreme Court litigation). But see Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co.,
339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (criticizing amicus briefs that duplicate party

arguments or are "used to make an end run around court-imposed limitations on the length of
parties' briefs").
92 Amici curiae on Alison's behalf also included the Gay and Lesbian Parents
Coalition International et al., "Concerned Academics," including Deborah A. Batts et al., and
the Youth Law Center. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991); Press
Release, Lambda Legal, supra note 86.
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when their caregivers' rights are adjudicated,
and about current social
93
science research related to child development.
Amicus briefs also add to any litigation in ways that go beyond
their explication of the relevant law or social science. By presenting
narratives of people who are affected by the issue before the court, they can
illuminate the real-life consequences of a case and counter the abstract
focus on doctrine that sometimes takes hold at the appellate level. Abortion
rights advocates, for example, have used this type of story-telling brief to
bring forward the stories of women who have been harmed by restrictions
on access to abortion.94 In Alison D., the Gay and Lesbian Parents Coalition
International took up this task. Its brief told the actual stories of several
families to show that when same-sex couples have children together, they,
like heterosexual couples, do not consider one partner the "real" parent and
the other partner just a supporting actor, as Virginia had characterized
Alison.
In addition to their substantive storytelling role, amicus briefs also
make the court aware of the groups that have a stake in the case beyond the
litigants. To be sure, some groups may have little influence in this regard
because their support is predictable. The presence of a gay and lesbian
parents group in the case, for example, was unlikely to add great weight in
this respect, as few would be surprised to see advocates for legal
recognition of gay-parented families coming into the case.
But when organizations that are not presumptive allies file an
amicus brief on a party's behalf, they alert the court that support also exists
from credible "outsiders." For this reason, among others, Ettelbrick worked
93 New social science data at the time showed that a parent's sexual orientation has
no bearing on a child's healthy emotional development. See, e.g., ROBERTA ACHTENBERG,
LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 1-3 (1987);
Sharon L. Huggins, A ComparativeStudy of Self-Esteem of Adolescent Children of Divorced
Lesbian Mothers and Divorced HeterosexualMothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY
(Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989). See generally GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS (Frederick W.
Bozett ed., 1987); Donna J. Hutchens & Martha J. Kirkpatrick, Lesbian Mothers/Gay
Fathers, in EMERGING ISSUES INCHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 115 (Diane H. Schetky &
Elissa P. Benedek eds., 1985). For a discussion of more recent research, see Charlotte J.
Patterson et al., Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents: Research, Law, and Policy, in
CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 176 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2002).
94 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the
Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 137, 170-71 (1990) (considering briefs that included the testimony of women who had
had abortions); Sarah E. Bums, Notes from the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 198 (1990) (discussing a brief that summarized forty thousand women's
personal experiences with abortion).
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intently to encourage NOW LDEF, the national women's rights litigation
group, 95 to file a brief. Virginia's focus on the exclusive rights of biological
parents suggested that Alison's theory would render all biological parents
(including heterosexual single mothers) vulnerable to intrusive visitation
claims by third parties (such as abusive boyfriends). NOW LDEF's
presence could assure the court that a prominent women's rights
organization had thoughtfully considered the risks and had concluded that
Alison's position protected parental rights while also serving children's best
interests.
Similarly, the Youth Law Center's brief conveyed to the court that
an expert organization focused entirely on children's well-being agreed
with Alison that children are served best by maintaining ongoing
relationships with the parent figures in their lives. The brief of the Eleven
Concerned Academics, a consortium of family law scholars, also lent
credibility to Alison's arguments, at least to the extent that academics are
understood to offer a reasoned and unbiased consideration of an issue. 96 As
a joint statement of family law scholars, the academics' brief sent the
message that the nation's top experts found Alison's position to be the
better of the two.
On a more political level, the brief for the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York (ABCNY), New York City's twenty-thousand-plus
member bar association, 97 signaled that issue-oriented advocates and
experts were not alone in their attention to this case. Moreover, by
participating in the case, the ABCNY, as a relatively conservative and nonpartisan institution, conveyed that the court would not be going out on a
radical political limb if it ruled in Alison's favor.
While we do not know whether Virginia and her lawyers solicited
amicus briefs, the case reports indicate that none were filed to support her
position.

95 The group is now known as Legal Momentum. Legal Momentum, About Us,
http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/PageServer?pagename=aboutus I (last visited Mar. 29,
2008).
96 But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing "a law-profession culture[] that has largely signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda").
97 Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
http://www.nycbar.org/AboutUs/index.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).

About

Us,
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C. Oral Argument
In March 1991, the New York Court of Appeals heard oral
argument in the case, allotting each side thirty minutes. Ettelbrick, who
argued first, was questioned intensely about the court's role in interpreting
the term "parent" in the habeas statute that governed visitation. Associate
(later Chief) Judge Judith S. Kaye asked, for example: "How would we not
be fundamentally redefining the term 'parent' throughout the statutory law
and the case law of the State of New York?" 98 The court's seven judges also
pressed Ettelbrick on how the court could grant Alison standing to seek
visitation without leaving all biological parents subject to suits from family
friends, babysitters, or anyone else who had befriended the child. Ettelbrick
responded by trying, yet again, to tell Alison's story, reminding the court
that Alison was not a transient interloper in someone else's family but
rather had actively planned, with Virginia, to bring a child into the world. 99
Despite Ettelbrick's efforts, "several judges made it clear through their
questions to lawyers that they [were] uneasy about the broad implications of
the visitation case," as the New York Times reported shortly after the
argument.100
Maccarini had great difficulty expressing Virginia's side of the
story, stumbling a number of times as he presented her position. Still, his
bottom line was clear: "The respondent here is a parent of her child ....
The appellant is not.'"1 1 He continued: "And like any other parent, lesbian
or not, the respondent has a right to raise her child as she sees fit and
determine who her child can associate with."' 02 Responding to the court's
concerns about the scope of judicial authority,
he urged that any adjustment
03
of visitation rights be left to the legislature.
98Kevin Sack, Visitation Case Could Redefine Parenthood,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1991, at 134 [hereinafter Sack, Visitation Case].

99A videotape of Ettelbrick's argument has been used in some law school classes
to illustrate exemplary oral advocacy. Given the court's decision in the case, however, the
tape also serves as a reminder that the quality of argument is not necessarily a predictor of
success. The tape of the oral argument can be ordered, for a fee, from Albany Law School.
See supra note 13.
100Sack, Visitation Case, supra note 98.
1o1Id.
102id.
103id.
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D. A Final Loss for Alison
On May 2, 1991, nearly four years after Virginia unilaterally cut off
Alison's contact with Andrew, the Court of Appeals ruled, in a 6-1 per
curiam opinion, that Alison, as a "biological stranger" to her son, had no
standing to seek visitation: "[A]lthough petitioner apparently nurtured a
close and loving relationship with the child,
she is not a parent within the
"
meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 70. 104
The court's brief opinion fully embraced Virginia's position. "To
allow the courts to award visitation ... to a third person," it held, "would
necessarily impair the parents' right to custody and control."' 10 5 Relying in
significant part on Ronald FF., the court observed that "[w]hile one may
dispute in an individual case whether it would be beneficial to a child to
have continued contact with a nonparent, the Legislature did not in section
70 give such nonparent the opportunity to compel a fit parent to allow them
to do so.' 1 6 Having framed the issue as a conflict between the New York
legislature's intent and Alison's aims,
the court held that only the legislature
07
concerns.1
Alison's
address
could
Judge
Kaye's dissent, by contrast, embraced Alison's
characterization of the issue as implicating the rights of many adults who
function in parent-like relationships with children. She wrote, "The Court's
decision, fixing biology as the key to visitation rights, has impact far
beyond this particular controversy, one that may affect a wide spectrum of
relationships-including those of longtime heterosexual stepparents,
'common-law' and nonheterosexual partners such as involved here, and
even participants in scientific reproduction procedures."' 0 8 Observing that
"more than 15.5 million children do not live with two biological parents,
and that as many as 8 to 10 million children are born into families with a
gay or lesbian parent," Judge Kaye emphasized that "the impact of [the]
decision falls hardest on the children of those relationships, limiting their
opportunity to maintain bonds that may be crucial to their development.' 0 9
1o4Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam).
105Id. at

29 (citing Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987)).

106Id.

I7
id.
108Id. at
1O9Id.

30 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
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Judge Kaye added that the majority had expanded Ronald FF. beyond its
original contours, and also contested the idea that granting standing to
Alison would destabilize New York's family law, noting that Braschi's
recognition of function over form "did not effect a wholesale change in the
law.' 10

IV. THE DECISION'S AFTERMATH
The day after the decision was handed down, Maccarini told the
New York Times, "The ruling just confirms that if there is going to be a
change in the definition of parent, this is not the forum for it," and added,
"There are just too many social issues here."' By contrast, there was a
chorus of disappointment on the other side. Ettelbrick described the ruling
as "a fairly major setback for the gay and lesbian rights movement because
it says that society does not recognize our relationships."' 2 William3
Rubenstein of the ACLU, who had represented the gay tenant in Braschi,"
commented that the court "had the reality of family life staring them in the
face and they blinked."' 4 The executive director of NOW LDEF noted
starkly "that the courthouse doors have been closed to millions of children
being raised by caring people not biologically related to them."'" 15
Alison's lawyers were not only saddened for Alison and her son but
were also worried that the decision would be followed wholesale by other
state courts. And to some degree, that is what happened. For several years
after Alison D., courts regularly rejected the claims of lesbian co-parents to
maintain relationships with the children they had planned for and parented
with their former partners. Within two months, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court rejected a non-biological mother's claim for custody or visitation
based on her status as an equitable or de facto parent." 6 In 1997, the
110Id. at 32.

Kevin Sack, Lesbian Loses a Ruling on Parent's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1991, at B I [hereinafter Sack, Lesbian Loses].
112id.
"U

See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50 (N.Y. 1989).

114Sack, Lesbian Loses, supra note 111.
"1

Gary Spencer, Mother's Lesbian PartnerDenied Visitation Rights, N.Y. L.J.,

May 3, 1991, at 1.
116In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991), overruled by In re Custody of

H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
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Vermont Supreme Court did the same, citing Alison D. for the proposition
that a non-biological parent was not a parent for purposes of visitation
rights.11 7 Notably, several courts also relied on Alison D. to deny standing to
adults who had parented children while in heterosexual relationships,
confirming the concerns11 of
Alison's lawyers that the decision would cast a
8
broad, harmful shadow.
The legal fallout in the years immediately following Alison D. did
not entirely track the New York Court of Appeals' approach, however. In
that first year, a New Mexico appellate court specifically rejected the
reasoning in Alison D. and permitted a lesbian co-parent to seek visitation
with the child she had been raising with her former partner." 9 In 1995, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled its own version of Alison D. and
granted standing to a lesbian co-parent on the ground that she was a de facto
parent.120 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and a trial-level court
in Missouri also both ruled that a non-biological lesbian parent had standing
to bring a visitation petition.121
Moreover, as is often the case, a loss in one area of the law spurs
victories in a related area to redress problems left exposed by the loss. In
New York, this victory, albeit a partial one, came in 1995 in two
consolidated cases when the New York Court of Appeals affirmed that

117 Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689-90 (Vt. 1997). For other appellate

rulings rejecting visitation claims by lesbian co-parents, see, for example, Music v.
Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723
N.E.2d 316 (Il. App. Ct. 1999); Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991);
Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1997).
118

See, e.g., Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239-41 (App. Div. 2001)

(invoking Alison D. to deny standing to a man who parented a child with his girlfriend from
toddlerhood until age eight); Sean H. v. Leila H., 783 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788-90 (Sup. Ct. 2004)

(holding that a non-biological father lacked standing under Alison D. to seek visitation even
after having held the child out as his biological son for several years, including giving the
child his name); cf In re B.E.D., No. W2003-02026-COA-R3-JV, 2004 WL 572342, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2004) (relying on Alison D. to support the rejection of visitation
rights for the child's adult sibling).
"' A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
120

In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 419, overruling In re Z.J.H., 471

N.W.2d 202.
121

E.N.O. v. L.L.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); In re T.L., No. 953-2340,

1996 WL 393521 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 7, 1996). In In re T.L., the court held that an equitable
parent would have standing to seek custody as well as visitation. Id. at *3.
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unmarried adults can adopt their partners' biological children. 122 This
practice is now widely known as second-parent adoption. 123 The pair of
cases involved two couples, one lesbian and the other heterosexual. 124 The
non-biological parent in each case, with the agreement of the biological
parent, sought to adopt his or her partner's child. 25 This was an action that
Alison and Virginia (along with most other lesbian and gay parents a
decade earlier) had not even contemplated. 26 Chief Judge Kaye wrote a
lengthy opinion for the court that focused largely on statutory interpretation
but also highlighted the policy arguments supporting adoption in these
cases, particularly the issue of the child's "emotional security... should the
coparents separate."'' 27 "[V]iewed from the children's perspective," she
noted, "permitting the adoptions allows the children to achieve a measure of
permanency with both parent figures and
avoids the sort of disruptive
' 28
visitation battle we faced in [Alison D.].'

For Alison and her son, this important development came too late.
Presumably, had second-parent adoption been available at the time Andrew
was born, Virginia and Alison both would have wanted Alison to adopt
Andrew to provide security for their family. Instead, the absence of legal
rights for Alison in the early 1990s meant that Andrew lost one of his
parents at an early age. But at least for many other families, the
circumstances have continued to improve, with a significant jump in legal
security for lesbian-headed families in recent years. Since 2000, most state
appellate courts deciding cases like Alison D. have permitted lesbian coparents to seek custody or visitation after the termination of the adults'
relationship, embracing de facto parenthood, in loco parentis, and equitable
122

In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).

123

See generally Patricia J. Falk, Second-ParentAdoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 93

(2000).
124In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 397. In re Jacob built on a New York Surrogate's

Court decision issued shortly after Alison D. that allowed a non-biological mother to adopt

the child she was raising with her partner under the same adoption rules that apply to stepparents. See In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992); see also In re
Adoption of Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Fain. Ct. 1994).
125In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398.
126

See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.

127In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.
128

Id. (citing Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991)).
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estoppel theories as a means of protecting the child's best interests. 29 In
addition, second-parent adoption is widely, though not universally,
available to secure the legal relationship between a non-biological parent
and child. 130 The changes can likely be attributed in large part to broader
societal acceptance of lesbians and gay men and, more specifically, to
greater acceptance of and familiarity with lesbian- and gay-parented
families, though it is of course impossible to link the legal developments
definitively to these societal changes.131
The American Law Institute (ALI) has incorporated many of these
developments into its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, which
were adopted and promulgated in 2000.132 The Principles, which address
issues ranging from custodial and decision-making responsibility to child
129 See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); King v. S.B., 837

N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005); V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); T.B.
v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005). In addition, in the course of holding a nonbiological lesbian parent liable for child support, the California Supreme Court disapproved
of numerous prior rulings that non-biological lesbian mothers were not legal parents. See
Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
By contrast, the Utah Supreme Court held in early 2007 that a lesbian co-parent
did not have standing to seek visitation with the child she had been raising with her former
partner, with whom she had entered into a civil union in Vermont. See Jones v. Barlow, 154
P.3d 808 (Utah 2007). Similarly, in 2000, the Tennessee Court of Appeals relied on Alison
D. to deny standing to two women who had been raising children with their former partners.
See In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 922-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
For further discussion of the legal theories available to support standing for nonbiological parents, see Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:
Adjudicating Maternity for NonbiologicalLesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (2002);
Polikoff, supra note 17; Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 662-78
(2002); Rachel E. Shoaf, Note, Two Mothers and Their Child: A Look at the Uncertain
Status of Nonbiological Lesbian Mothers Under Contemporary Law, 12 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 267 (2005).
130

See generally Sonja Larsen, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 27

A.L.R. 5th 54 (1995). Second-parent adoption is generally available to different-sex couples
wherever it is available to same-sex couples. See Falk, supra note 123, at 94-95.
131 See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil

Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006)
(addressing the relationship between changing social views and legal change).
132

PRINCIPLES

RECOMMENDATIONS §§

OF

THE

LAW

OF

FAMILY

2.03(l)(b)-(c), 2.18 (2002).

DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS

AND
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support and property distribution, devote extensive attention to the rights
and responsibilities of adults who are not biologically or legally related to
the children they parent. 133 Most relevant to Alison's situation, the
Principles endorse legal recognition for a "parent by estoppel," defined as
an individual who has "lived with the child since the child's birth, holding
out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a
prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal parent . . . to raise a
child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities.' 34 The
Principles also provide for recognition of a "de facto parent," defined as an
individual who has resided with the child for at least two years and who
regularly, "for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and
with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship,"
has performed significant parenting functions.135 In its commentary, the
ALI explains that "[t]he standards reflect the societal consensus that
responsibility for children ordinarily should be retained by a child's parents,
while recognizing that there are some exceptional circumstances in which
' 36
the child's needs are best served by continuity of care by other adults.'
Although the Principles are not binding on any state, 37 they provide
advocates for parents in Alison's situation with additional important
authority for their claims.
New York, however, has kept the barrier to visitation (and custody)
petitions frozen where it was in 1991. Lower courts continue to treat Alison
D. as barring all equitable actions by non-legal lesbian parents.
Consequently, non-legal lesbian parents who have not completed secondparent adoptions remain shut out from even seeking visitation with the
children they were raising with a former partner. 38 In 2005, in a case
133Id.

134 Id. § 2.03(l)(b)(iii). Section (b) also provides alternate definitions for "parent
by estoppel" under subsections (i), (ii), and (iv), which are not relevant here. See id. §
2.03(l)(b).

131Id. § 2.03(l)(c). Section (c) also includes, within its definition of de facto
parent, an adult who takes on the caretaking role as a result of the failure or inability of the
legal parent to do so. See id. § 2.03(l)(c)(ii).
1361Id. § 2.18 cmt. a.
131Id. § 1.01 (defining a "rule of statewide application" as "a rule that implements
a Principle set forth herein" and declaring that "a rule of statewide application may be
established by legislative, judicial, or administrative action").
08 See, e.g., Behrens v. Rimland, 822 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 2006) (denying
standing to a non-legal mother); Lee P.S. v. Lisa L., 753 N.Y.S.2d 860 (App. Div. 2003)
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similar to Alison D., a New York family court explained that it considered
itself
[U]nfortunately constrained to find that petitioner lacks standing
to seek visitation with the child who has enjoyed a close and
loving relationship with petitioner since infancy, with no
consideration as to any detriment such a harsh result will have on
this child .... Given the frequency with which children today are
being raised by and bonding with long-term heterosexual
stepparents (who are equally affected by the holdings herein) and
nonmarital homosexual partners, perhaps the time has
come for
139
the Court of Appeals to revisit its ruling in Alison D.
Arguably, a court could conclude that Alison D. is not such an
absolute barrier. After all, the decision did not explicitly foreclose several
equitable arguments that the legal parent's cultivation of the other adult's
parental role requires recognition of the non-legal parent. Indeed, New York
courts have applied equitable theories in cases decided after Alison D. to
recognize the rights of functional (but non-legal) fathers seeking visitation
against the wishes of the child's biological mother.140 Yet these same courts
have refused to carry over this reasoning to cases where the parents are of
the same sex, raising equal protection concerns that courts have not
addressed. 141
(same); Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381 (App. Div. 2002) (same); Speed v.
Robins, 732 N.Y.S.2d 902 (App. Div. 2001) (same); Lynda A.H. v. Diane T.O., 673
N.Y.S.2d 989 (App. Div. 1998) (same); C.M. v, C.H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 2004)
(same). The courts would presumably apply the same ruling to petitions brought by a nonlegal gay father, but there are no reported cases with those facts. In the interest of full
disclosure, I presented oral argument on behalf of the non-legal parent in the appellate
litigation of Behrens.
139 See Same-Sex Partner Lacks Standing to Seek Visitation Rights with Ex-

Partner'sAdopted Child, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 2005, at 21 (reprinting unpublished opinion in
Denise B. v. Beatrice R.).
140 See, e.g., Gilbert A. v. Laura A., 689 N.YS.2d 810 (App. Div. 1999) (granting

standing to a man who functioned as the child's father, but lacked biological ties, to show
that extraordinary circumstances existed to justify custody or visitation with the child born
during his marriage to the child's mother, and basing the order in part on the mother's direct
involvement in cultivating the parent-child relationship); Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676
N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1998) (allowing a functional, but not biological, father to invoke
equitable estoppel to continue his relationship with the child born during his marriage to the
child's mother).
141 For the first time ever, a New York Supreme Court ruling recently

distinguished Alison D. in a lesbian co-parent dispute and found that equitable estoppel
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Even with this uninviting landscape, parents in New York with no
other options continue to bring (and lose) claims to maintain their
relationships with their children, though their case presentation strategy has
adjusted with the times. Litigators no longer need to explain, for example,
that lesbian couples have children or provide courts with background on
physician-assisted insemination. At the same time, however, courts often
ask lawyers to explain why the non-legal parent did not complete a secondparent adoption to secure her ties to the child while the couple was
43
together. 142 In fact, many couples deliberately delay the adoption process,
though not typically out of a lack of commitment, as judges sometimes
assume. Instead, as with other legal protections that people should pursue
but often do not (like making a will), couples delay second-parent adoption
for a range of reasons. For example, the process can be expensive for
couples who, in many cases, need to hire not only a lawyer but also a social
worker to do an in-home evaluation. Some couples who plan to have more
than one child simply find it more efficient and economical to wait to do all
of the adoptions together.144 In addition, couples seeking to adopt another
child from a country that disfavors same-sex couples may delay the
adoption process to avoid exposing their relationship and jeopardizing their
opportunity to adopt a sibling for their child(ren). 145 Yet, even courts wellinformed about the reasons for delayed adoption, about cases granting
equitable relief to functional fathers, and about the myriad other changes in

principles authorized the non-biological mother's standing to seek a continued relationship
with her children. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 2008). Unlike other
cases in which Alison D.'s holding was enforced to deny parental status to the non-legal

parent, the adults in this case had married each other in Canada, and the court found the
marriage to be a "significan[t]" additional factor in its determination. Id. at 509. The trial
court also relied on a 2006 ruling in which the New York Court of Appeals estopped a nonbiological father from denying paternity of a child he had supported and visited
intermittently. Id. at 507 (citing Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006)).
142 E-mail

Interview with Judith E. Turkel, Partner, Turkel Forman & de la Vega
LLP (Mar. 14, 2008) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Turkel Interview]. Ms. Turkel is a
New York City-based lawyer with more than two decades of experience representing lesbian
and gay parents. Turkel Forman & de la Vega LLP, Judith E. Turkel,
http://www.tfvlaw.com/judith.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
143 Turkel Interview, supra note 142.
144id.
45id.
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recognition of the rights of gay people continue to adhere rigidly to Alison
D. 146
Similarly, the state legislature has made no significant effort to
reverse the effects of Alison D. In the wake of many significant legislative
efforts to secure marriage rights for same-sex couples, 147 this inaction might
seem surprising. On the other hand, it took New York until 2002 to amend
the state's antidiscrimination law to cover sexual orientation, 48 something
twelve other states had already accomplished at that point.1 49 Other
provisions of the state's family law that likewise are arguably in need of
revision-such as the divorce law, which, unlike the law in any other state,
requires a showing of adultery or a legal separation agreement before
authorizing divorcel 50-have endured without effective legislative reform
for many years despite significant criticism."'

146See, e.g., Behrens v. Rimland, 822 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 2006).
147The New York State Assembly has considered, but has not voted on, bills
granting marriage to same-sex couples for several years. For updated information, see
Empire
State
Pride
Agenda, Legislation
and Other
Governmental
Action,
http://www.prideagenda.org/[ssuesExplained/MarriageandFamilyProtection/LegislationandO
therGovemmentAction/tabid/71/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Empire State
Pride Agenda is New York's statewide legislative advocacy organization for the rights of
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgender individuals. See Empire State Pride Agenda,
Our Mission and Public Policy, http://www.prideagenda.org/AboutUs/OurMissionand
PublicPolicy/tabid!55/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Many of the Pride Agenda's
recent family law reform efforts have focused on securing protections for adult relationships
either by marriage or other means. See, e.g., Empire State Pride Agenda, Marriage and
Family
Protection,
http://dnn.prideagenda.org/IssuesExplained/MarriageandFamily
Protection/tabid/67/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
148 N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 292, 296 (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2007). Sections
291, 292, and 296 set forth New York's protected classes for antidiscrimination purposes in
the context of, inter alia, employment, housing, education, and places of public
accommodation. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was not prohibited under
these sections until 2002. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291, L.2002, ch. 2 (effective 2003).
149See Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, New York Outlaws Anti-Gay
Discrimination (Dec. 17, 2002), http://www.prideagenda.org/tabid/304/default.aspx?c=272.
150New York is now the only state in the country to "require[] the finding of fault
or living apart pursuant to a legal document as a basis for divorce." S.C. v. A.C., 798
N.Y.S.2d 348 at *5 (2004) (unpublished table decision).
151See, e.g., Molinari v. Molinari, 839 N.Y.S.2d 434 (2007) (unpublished table
decision) (identifying problems flowing from existing law and calling for legislative action).
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V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
One might ask, in light of the law's intransigence in New York,
why bother? Is law reform litigation in this area, no matter how carefully
crafted, an exercise in futility? Certainly, if one evaluates the work by the
win-loss record of advocates for non-legal lesbian mothers in New York
during the past decade, there would seem to be little value in continuing to
seek law reform on this issue.
Yet to stop now would be to miss one of the central points of law
reform litigation. As discussed at the outset, law reform cases are defined,
in part, by an effort to move beyond the status quo and change the law in
ways that advocates believe are in the interest of justice. Winning a lawsuit
can accomplish this, of course. Even when cases are lost, however, the very
act of litigating against injustice can sometimes be an important step toward
a victory on a similar issue in a subsequent lawsuit. The drumbeat of
lawsuits maintains both public and legal attention, helping to ensure that
this class of litigants will not be forgotten. Further, repeated, unsuccessful
litigation shows, in stark relief, the terrible losses caused by an approach to
family law that, in this area, is unresponsive to family life. The litigation, in
other words, helps shape the public conversation. It frames a problem and
proposes a solution.
Consequently, although lawyers for individuals like Alison
continue to engage the same types of strategic questions about how best to
persuade courts to recognize family relationships that are visible
everywhere except in the law, the backdrop against which they are working
is different, and richer, than when Alison first brought her case. There is
now a documented history of the custody and visitation law's nonresponsiveness to families in which one parent is legally recognized and the
other is not. In this history lies the opportunity for law reform efforts to
continue, and for advocates to work on framing and reframing the story so
that, one day, telling the family story in this kind of case will become runof-the-mill family court conflict-resolution fare, rather than an achievement
in and of itself.

